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Ideas of property, history, and subjectivity converge in Frances Sheridan’s The Memoirs of 
Miss Sidney Bidulph (1761) and Elizabeth Griffith’s The History of Lady Barton (1771). Both 
novels explore the centrality of property in the creation of a viable identity – one that lends 
authority to history and the law as culturally and individually determining narratives. At the 
level of form and content, these texts demonstrate the connections between textual authority 
and women’s lived experience. For the novel’s protagonists—Sidney Bidulph and Louisa 
Barton—the act of writing preserves individuality separate from these dominant narratives. 
Their continued inscription of their own experiences works as a form of witnessing or 
testimony that refuses the erasure imposed by legal and historical models. Sidney’s 
“memoirs” and Louisa’s “history” problematize the relationship between the assumed 
subjectivity of fiction and the assumed clarity and objectivity of historical writing. Written in 
the same period that produced Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1764-
1769) and national histories by David Hume (1754-1763) and Catharine Macaulay (1763-
1783), these novels challenge a gendered separation between culturally valuable literary 
production and excessive, wasteful products of ‘feminized’ genres such as the novel and 
romance. The concern in both novels is not the historically-produced subject but the process 
by which historiography flattens and erases alternatives to dominant narratives. This essay 
argues that these novels reveal the ways in which history and the law, while seeming to 
occupy a position beyond manipulation, exist as narratives vulnerable to textual 
misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and misreading. By creating “histories” and “memoirs” 
through romantic, Gothic, and sentimental conventions, Sheridan and Griffith use the generic 
authority of history to evaluate the cost of women’s exclusion from legal and historical 
lineages of subjectivity and personhood. 
 
The History of Lady Barton  includes letters to and from Louisa Barton and her sister, Fanny 
Cleveland, as well as other exchanges between various characters. The main narrative 
concerns Louisa’s growing affection for the worthy Lord Lucan and her dissatisfaction with 
her husband, Sir William Barton. While Lord Lucan returns her affections, Louisa remains 
faithful to Sir William but allows her guilt to eat away at her psyche and her health. Sir 
William suspects much and accuses Louisa of orchestrating a miscarriage to deprive him of a 
legitimate heir. Confined to her house, Louisa becomes William’s prisoner until her 
innocence is proven through the confessions of the dastardly Colonel Walter, a man who has 
imprisoned and deserted his own wife and daughter. Repentant, Sir William returns to 
Louisa, whose delicate decline is irreversible: she dies, having recognized her love for Sir 
William, in the presence of her husband and sister. Yet, the ‘history of Lady Barton’ is not 
just the history of Louisa Barton. The text includes other exchanges that detail Fanny’s own 
courtship and eventual marriage, a kidnap plot involving their brother’s finacée, a woman 
escaping from unjust imprisonment, and the experiences of a young Englishman abroad. The 
letters concern courtship and marriage, family responsibilities, literature, and morality. They 
also illustrate the many and varied functions of letter writing: the letters communicate, 
inform, entreat, and make explicit demands on the reader; they justify the writer’s position 
and decisions and enable dialogue between characters divided by situation and setting. This 
plurality of “histories”, similar to Sidney Bidulph’s layered “memoir”, is crucial to the ways 
in which this text enacts a resistance to the normalizing force of historical and legal 
narratives.  
 
The Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph carries the distinction of having caused Samuel Johnson 
to enquire whether Sheridan had the “right, upon moral principles, to make . . . readers suffer 
so much” (qtd. in Boswell 1: 210). A paragon of sentimental virtue, Sidney Bidulph begins 
her memoirs on the cusp of a sound and happy marriage to Orlando Faulkland, her brother’s 
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best friend. When an anonymous tip reveals that Faulkland has ruined a young woman named 
Miss Burchell, Sidney’s mother calls off the engagement and takes Sidney away from the 
city. In the countryside, she meets and marries Mr Arnold. Their marriage is content and 
Sidney has two daughters before Arnold is seduced into an affair by a Mrs Gerrarde. Patient 
to the last, Sidney removes from her marital home and lives on a strict economy with her two 
girls until the affair is resolved, through Faulkland’s efforts, and Mr Arnold returns. 
Forgiven, Mr Arnold dies but not before a claim on his family’s estate is decided against his 
favour and Sidney is left with two children in dire straits. The appearance of an uncle, Ned 
Warner, earns Sidney an inheritance that enables her to demonstrate her benevolence. 
Faulkland has, in the meanwhile, married Miss Burchell to prove his character to Sidney – a 
testament to his unchanging love for her. The new couple go to Faulkland’s estate in Ireland. 
Eventually, Miss Burchell reveals her ‘true’ character and intentions: she takes a lover and is 
discovered with him by Faulkland, who kills both by accident. Returning to Sidney, 
Faulkland demands her hand in marriage, to which she assents; they are married, but 
Faulkland departs the country to avoid the law almost immediately. A letter arrives that 
informs Sidney that Miss Burchell (Mrs Faulkland) is not dead. When Faulkland hears the 
news, he commits suicide. Sidney’s narrative, picked up by her correspondent and friend, 
Cecilia Rivers, winds down the main story before ending by projecting further misfortunes 
and breaking off suddenly. In spite of the single narrative voice, Sidney’s memoirs actually 
contain, through reported speech and action as well as through included letters from various 
characters, the stories of a wide variety of characters including Sidney’s mother, Faulkland, 
Miss Burchell, and Mrs Gerrarde. 
 
The difference between the titles of these two texts is vital. The history of Lady Barton 
immediately presents the protagonist as a legal subject and inscribes her with a legal identity 
that fits a broader historical narrative. The memoirs of Sidney Bidulph, on the other hand, 
insist on the protagonist’s birth-name, though she becomes Mrs Arnold very early on. History 
and law construct women’s roles chronologically and linearly as a procession from daughter 
to wife to mother to widow; memory, however, reveals the disjointed psychic trauma that 
such narratives perpetrate on the bodies of women. Louisa Barton is an illustrative example: 
unhappily married and in love with another man, Louisa miscarries. Sir William, distraught 
and already suspicious of Louisa’s affections, accuses her of plotting to deprive him of an 
heir, of deliberately miscarrying. Perversely, Sir William reads Louisa’s body as resistant to 
the narrative – her miscarriage signals her “refusal” to progress from wife to mother, a move 
which also confirms her status as property. Her death, which occurs shortly after the 
miscarriage (from which she does not recover), follows as a consequence of this refusal: her 
only remaining option is to abdicate her role entirely – an act that renders her value as an 
abstraction and admits the impossibility of narrating the physical, material remains of her 
existence. In Sidney Bidulph, the text manifests the trauma experienced by the protagonist: 
the title only initially correlates with the heroine, but her marriage to Mr Arnold distances her 
from her own story. Neither the law nor history can possess memory, which adheres precisely 
where such objective narratives lose traction and fall away: the body becomes the irreducible 
and unutterable site of individual subjectivity.  
 
The same discourses that would celebrate this emancipatory possibility of the flesh, however, 
are also brought to face with the body-as-object. Thus, the question of subjectivity becomes 
oddly located in a discourse of objectification as the site of conflicting pressures of history 
and memory. Louisa’s particular history is subsumed into the universalising abstract role of 
“wife”; as Lady Barton, she has a history without memory; as Louisa, her memories are 
excessive, unnecessary, extraneous to the position of wife offered as choice but presented as 
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destiny. The lineage of legal practice based on a record of precedent and chronology provide 
both history and law with form and structure; the folds of personal memory are more 
appropriate to the creative heterogeneity of ‘fiction’. Form and content, story and story-teller: 
Louisa and Sidney become metonymic of their own narratives, creating a deeply embodied 
and multifaceted mise-en-abyme. By disrupting and disregarding linearity, both novels 
threaten the sanctity of lineage and inheritance crucial to the authority of history and law. 
This same disruption also enables moments whose affective power comes from transience 
rather than permanence. Thus, where the traditional sentimental narrative spends its energy in 
making the moment of marriage a symbolic climax, these texts disperse that force and 
examine the effects of this event. Both Sidney and Louisa insist on the persistent return of a 
complex subject that extends beyond the available ideological container for “wife”. Memory 
locates the origin of experience in the body, but, as evidenced by these heroines, participation 
in history requires a traumatic disembodiment. 
 
This tension between the material and the abstract location of experience is evident in Sir 
William Blackstone’s four-volume Commentaries on the Laws of England, which made its 
first appearance in the decade between the publications of Sidney Bidulph and Lady Barton. 
Blackstone’s Commentaries grants women a body in order to demonstrate the extent of the 
law’s power over the material world. The first volume treats the “Rights of Persons” and 
places the chapter “On Husband and Wife” between chapters detailing the reciprocal duties 
of masters and servants, and of parents and children. This syntactical positioning reflects the 
uncertainties and convictions of mid-century legal representations of wives as subjects to the 
authority of men in relationships determined by commercial and private ties. “Servant”, 
“wife”, and “child” in the same position in each chapter title display through a coincidence of 
grammar the perception of the analogous state of dependency of each. Blackstone’s 
discussion of the laws pertaining to wives is the most explicit example of how the 
Commentaries come dangerously close to undermining the authority of the law by bringing it 
within the authority of text. While history ratifies and confirms law, it also threatens to 
subject the law to its own processes. Similarly, the legal position of wife shows the “favour” 
shown to English women, but that position is immediately taken back, since the wife is 
“subsumed” by the husband through marriage. The creation of legal subjects requires the 
erasure of individuals; women, as already only tenuously “individual”, enable the law to 
disguise violence as preference. Women are recognized as subjects of the law only to be 
removed active agents altogether. It is the second volume, “Rights of Things”, that Gothic 
scholars have particularly claimed for their own, particularly the metaphor of England’s 
constitution as an “old Gothic castle” (Blackstone 2:221). While it has become standard for 
Gothic criticism to point out Blackstone’s structural metaphor for the law, less attention has 
been paid to how Blackstone conceptualizes the law as inheritance with its own lineage. 
 
The interest in creating grand-scale histories – of the nation, of the nation’s laws, of the 
nation’s literature – is an important feature of the ideological landscape in which Sheridan 
and Griffith wrote and published. This period of nation-building is bracketed by the “year of 
victories” (1759) and the first decade of the nineteenth century which saw the Act of Union 
with Ireland and the end of the French Revolutionary Wars. Success on the world stage (with 
the notable exception of the American colonies) translated into optimistic, Enlightenment 
versions of history as evidence of the ongoing process by which society would arrive at 
perfection. As Harriet Guest and Devoney Looser have discussed, women figure frequently 
as an index of progress in eighteenth-century histories: they are the necessary victims of 
barbarian societies and a luxury of enlightened civilization. The role of women in history, 
however, remains marginal. They are largely absent (except when appearing as queens) from 
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both Hume’s and Macaulay’s histories, both of which perform a similar feat to Blackstone’s 
work on the law: ordering history into a linear narrative of cultural progress. While the origin 
of national history is, perhaps, less fraught than that of law, Hume’s history suggests the same 
desire to establish the nation through difference by positing the origin of England outside of 
and antecedent to the history of the nation itself. Thus, his history begins with the invasion of 
Julius Caesar and ends with the Glorious Revolution of 1688: when, exactly, “England” 
emerges, or what precisely constitutes “England”, remains ambiguous.  
 
As Sue Chaplin argues, “the law must be grounded in some certain principle” in order to 
beget a “legitimate chain of succession” (23). To speak of the lineage of the law is to engage 
in precisely the work that Blackstone set out in his Commentaries, and more broadly the kind 
of work done by national and literary historians in the latter half of the century. Locating the 
present incarnation of law as simultaneously ancient and modern, Blackstone comes 
precariously close to exposing the foundational myth of authority upon which the law 
depends. Crucially, the law does not exist in his Commentaries, which are supplemental; the 
law can only be demonstrated through its affective regulation of material bodies. To speak of 
the law as text “deprives it of its origin in the spoken word . . . the paternal principle . . . 
meant to guarantee its transcendence, rationality, and distance from myth” (Chaplin 28). In 
Blackstone’s introduction, oral tradition imparts an almost familial intimacy between the law 
and its subjects; it is “handed down by tradition, use, and experience”, unwritten and 
therefore immemorial and universal (1:17).  
 
The connections I wish to draw are between the physicality of the law as expressed through 
the bodies of listeners, the proximity demanded by a system based in orality, and the 
paradoxical abstraction created through materialising language in text. The oral nature of 
Common Law creates a linguistic community that establishes its borders at the limits of 
language: “foreign clergy” did not “relish” English Common Law as they were “utter 
strangers to our constitution as well as our language” (1:17, my emphasis). Establishing 
juridical lineage as protected from “strangers” by the natural phenomenon of common speech 
ensures that the lineages produced by law are similarly protected. The law for Blackstone is 
the battleground between the private and the public, where “private” is understood in a 
broader context of the national and domestic versus a “foreign” (i.e. Papist) continental 
interest. For Sidney and Louisa, correspondence provides an alternative, textual, location that 
never attempts to usurp the authority of the spoken (paternal) word. Their histories and 
memoirs are not records of reported speech but, written from the point of view of a subject 
silenced culturally by gender and legally by coverture, are instead records of embodied 
experience that can only be traced through text and have no “paternal principle” based in 
speech. Furthermore, the careful presentation of both texts through a network of friends and 
family ensures that the texts continually construct the relationship with the reader as intimate 
and private. Their ‘listeners’ are always sympathetic and the dangerous materiality of their 
bodies is protected by their discretion and veiled appearance in text. 
 
Sidney and Louisa appear resolutely domestic: both shun public situations and are most 
secure (if not content) in their conjugal homes. Their containment within male properties 
represents their “containment” within safely conventional female roles. Yet the creation of 
“authentic” texts made up of private journals and intimate letters challenges the distinction 
between the private and the public, between the objectified objects and the active subjects of 
the legal discourses of possession and marriage. The Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph creates 
an intradiegetic network of concerned friends, culminating in the reader, who are engaged in 
bearing witness to Sidney’s misfortunes. Correspondence, in Sidney’s case, emphasises the 
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distance between herself, a wife – thus a “privatised” property – and her audience. The 
History of Lady Barton, on the other hand, plays with the possibility of correspondence as 
action. Unlike Sidney Bidulph, Louisa’s story occurs as the narrative unfolds – it is not 
already an historical artefact. As novels, the texts participate in an economy of literature as 
commodity, earning both material and cultural property for Frances Sheridan and Elizabeth 
Griffith. Both authors rely explicitly on the public/private dynamics of reading. Readers as 
participants, a model encouraged and sustained in eighteenth-century periodical literature, 
inform the structure of both texts. Cecilia Rivers, while unable to directly assist Sidney (as a 
married woman with her own family concerns, one assumes), collects and preserves the 
memoirs, enabling more sympathetic readers by providing the necessary context for Sidney’s 
story. Lady Barton’s primary correspondent is her sister, Fanny. As a feme sole for most of 
the novel, Fanny illustrates the confinement of coverture through her comparative freedom in 
responding to letters with direct action – most notably, her ability to go to  Delia Colville’s 
aid and to resolve the situation herself. Her action complicates the assumed passivity of 
reading and demonstrates the active virtue inspired by textual example; Fanny is not “Miss 
Howe . . . content . . . with poorly lamenting the unhappiness of my friend” (LB 3:251).  
 
Critics of women’s reading habits, particularly women’s perceived fascination with novels, 
focus often on the threatening continuity between character and reader; fearing the damage to 
“useful” and modest women through their consumption of sentimentally affecting literature. 
Edward Gibbon, David Hume, and James Boswell particularly despised women’s 
demonstration of “false taste” in reading materials, as well as women’s rush to skip past 
prefaces to get to a “picturesque scene, or a tender letter”, which, to them, implied a defiance 
of the authority of the author’s choice in setting out a text in a certain order (Pearson 5). 
These three critics are also historians; reading directed by the reader’s intentions, skipping 
randomly through a narrative, violates the chronology of progress so marked in eighteenth-
century histories (Pearson 5). Women writing demonstrated, on a material level, the radical 
potential for symbolic or cultural capital to become material wealth, even for those excluded 
by juridical processes of property inheritance. While moral authority pretended to an analogy 
with real property, the transition from abstract possession (education) to physical property in 
the literary marketplace was far more certain, in some ways. The ambiguity of how 
“literature” could be defined and regulated as a legal property, or what part of a “book” could 
be controlled by law, allowed a space in which women could explore a wide range of 
discourses. Commentators from the margins, women could read and write any text 
subversively (Pearson 6). By creating credible characters of public authority (lawyers, priests, 
fathers, and husbands, for example), women could explore through fiction the real exercise 
and effects of power. Its commitment to “realism” granted the novel a privileged place from 
which to launch critiques of social, political, and legal “realities” by calling attention to the 
narrative foundations of patriarchal power – namely, history. 
 
Novelistic realism presents Sheridan and Griffith with the space to explore believable 
situations and characters, reflecting lived experience through narrative conventions borrowed 
from both fictional and historical models. Verisimilitude was a critical element of a “good” 
novel; not only did this differentiate it from the romance, it enabled the reader to recognize 
the particulars as well as the general. More insidiously, verisimilitude manipulates readers’ 
recognition and approval of details into acquiescence to the larger “reality”: the general 
environment that produces the details is supported through tacit recognition of the symbolic 
power of those details. This same critical preference for verisimilitude produces strategies of 
resistance. Griffith, while remaining firmly within the boundaries of sensibility in terms of 
language and plot, explores female incarceration, emotional and psychological blackmail, and 
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spousal abuse. Her adherence to convention establishes the perceived “realism” of The 
History of Lady Barton: because she is working with genres already privileged by their 
natural resemblance to “reality” (history and the novel), the events of the narrative are 
already believable. The critic for the Monthly Review notes that the novel “abounds with 
affecting incidents, interesting situations, and . . . rational observations . . . expected from a 
person who converses with, and knows, the world” (“Art 28” 165, my emphasis). The 
mutually supportive relationship between history and the novel is evident in process as well 
as product: both “grow out of other forms and methods, [and] make use of them while at once 
cancelling and preserving them but without themselves being contaminated or changed” 
(Langbauer 33). Yet, the anxiety caused by possible generic contamination remains prevalent 
in these examples of women’s novels.  
 
One of the key differences between Sidney Bidulph and Lady Barton is the kind of 
relationship the eponymous protagonist imagines between herself and her text. Both Louisa’s 
“history” and Sidney’s “memoir” can be understood in terms of (auto)biography; the 
connotations of each, however, make it impossible to reconcile them to one definition. 
Calling the epistolary development of one character a “history” elevates that character and re-
establishes the instrumental purpose of history to reconcile the individual to a common 
narrative. Conduct literature and periodicals obviously recognized the educational value in 
publishing brief biographical sketches of exemplary women as role models for female readers 
and fictional biographies assume that edifying purpose. That a woman could have a history 
challenges the virtually absolute erasure of women from legal and political systems in the 
eighteenth century. Rather than establishing a private narrative niche within literary culture 
and, from there, champion the separation of the personal from the political (as perhaps a 
“memoir” might suggest), Griffith’s project at once claims to be read as a history and, in so 
doing, demonstrates the processes through which history earns its validity. Through its 
narrative structure of layered testimony and repetition, Lady Barton explores the potential for 
communities of women to create more democratic and vibrant histories, challenging the basis 
of their exclusion from broader narratives. Containing male-authored romances with a 
female-authored history, Griffith’s text disrupts the traditional gender/genre hierarchies of 
cultural value, subsuming masculine narratives within a feminine “history”. As precedents 
and models for behaviour, both male and female characters draw on romance characters and 
fables, illustrating the rich, open discourse of cultural production that embraces both 
historical “fact” and romantic “fable”. The range of secondary material cited in the various 
correspondences gestures towards the cultural education of the characters and Griffith’s own 
command of a wide range of literary and historical material.1  
 
In Griffith’s novel, several different voices take up self-directed, internal correspondences 
within Louisa’s history; Louisa has access to only some of these. The History of Lady Barton 
recognizes competing and conflicting interpretations of history and creates a space for several 
“versions”. Thus, Fanny and Louisa’s disagreements over wives’ duties and Louisa’s conduct 
emerge as the products of particular situations. Fanny’s advice on her sister’s conjugal woes 
can be read as the product of her particular social position as an independent feme sole. This 
is certainly how Louisa herself reads them, noting early in the text that Fanny is “very 
differently situated; mistress of leisure, and yourself” (LB 1:75). Similarly, Louisa’s letters 
reveal a specific set of circumstances that she uses to justify her actions not as a model for 
other women but as the result of her particular “history”. After avowing her love to Lord 
Lucan, Louisa inadvertently admits the limits of romance and history to adequately describe 
her own experiences. Interrupted by Colonel Walter, who jokingly inquires whether Lucan 
has “been relating the melancholy story of Eloise and Abelard, or the more disastrous loves 
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of Hero and Leander”, Louisa rejects such historical literary models: “we need not go so far 
back, for melancholy tales; for . . . I was acquainted with some persons now living, whose 
sufferings far exceeded those of the unfortunate ladies [Colonel Walter] had mentioned” (LB 
2:103). Louisa’s own experiences, her awareness of her friends’ histories, become more 
relevant than those of recognized “official” histories. In denying the power of history to 
express and contain women’s stories, Louisa exercises a moment of power over Colonel 
Walter. Knowledge of women’s real history (in this case, Mrs Walter’s story, but later Fanny 
exercises the same authority with her knowledge of Delia Colville’s case) is power for 
women in Griffith’s text. The ability to deny masculine representation in favour of women’s 
accounts of their own experience enables Louisa to (albeit briefly) exercise ownership of 
history. 
 
Control of history briefly collapses into a struggle for origins when Louisa accuses Fanny of 
forgetting details of family history due to her youth and inexperience. In this sense, Griffith’s 
sense of history resists closure and ownership because the limits and boundaries cannot be 
known. Each character understands each other, and history, through the mediating lens of 
their own experiences. Though George and Fanny Cleveland make appropriately sentimental 
marriages, taking their lessons from Louisa’s history, the investigation of a married woman’s 
history denies these sub-plots definite closure. Sidney Bidulph, on the other hand, reveals the 
authorial impulse towards control and ownership of history. Told only through Sidney’s 
voice and letters, Memoirs condenses various interpretations and experiences into one 
individual’s history. Sidney acts as mediator, gathering anecdotes and resources and 
repositioning them in relation to her own experiences. Faulkland’s romance-history (an 
interpretation of events) absorbs Mrs Gerrarde’s letter (a male-mediated example of female 
self-expression) and is, in turn, absorbed by Sidney’s letters (first-person, eye-witness 
accounts of personal “history”). Only Cecilia, whose letters do not appear in the text, exists 
outside of Sidney’s memoirs. All of the other characters suffer the same fate as women in 
traditional patriarchal histories: their experiences are pressed into the service of one dominant 
narrative and they are silenced. The Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph illustrates the illusion of 
history as an object with clear and identifiable boundaries. This is the same point at which 
Lady Barton crumbles into fragments: what part of the narrative comprises Lady Barton? 
What parts are separate? As an excess of narratives and letters, Lady Barton refuses to fit into 
one interpretation; it is impossible to represent as a coherent whole.  
 
The same illusion of wholeness allows both authors to question the inflated value of 
masculine cultural property compared with other, equally representative accounts of 
experience and expression. It is crucial that Lady Barton contains no dates – the letters are 
organised in order of writing and receiving (with some overlap) and are marked only by 
where they were written. In this sense, Griffith’s text resists traditional historical narration in 
favour of a more embodied representation of the writer; that is, a date does not reflect 
anything about the writer whereas a location contains the writer and determines the physical 
context for their writing. As the story progresses, this method increasingly measures place 
through property and ultimately divests itself of either. The third volume separates the letters 
by the order of their appearance (“Letter LXXI”) and the writer and receiver’s names. 
Significantly, the first letter in the novel is written from Bangor Ferry. Implicating both 
Louisa’s uneasy identity as Sir William’s wife, and the project of women’s history, The 
History of Lady Barton begins in a liminal space. The space Louisa inhabits throughout the 
text remains geographically and politically marginal, placing her in the position of constantly 
writing from the physical margin to the centre (Fanny in London). This spatial relation finds a 
correlation in Griffith’s project of presenting the life of a fictional woman as a “History”. The 
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recipients and writers of each letter suggest the play between margin and centre: Fanny 
moves increasingly out of the centre position as she takes on more physically active roles in 
discovering women obscured by history (actually travelling to France to find Delia Colville, 
Maria, Mrs. N--). As Fanny moves clearly outside of the socially acceptable position of 
female philanthropist (sentimentalizing a morally-valued financial transaction) into a more 
direct engagement with oppressive systems of law and politics, she physically moves away 
from the geographical capital, London. Organizing the History according to space also allows 
the temporal trajectory to remain productively obscure. Rather than obey a diachronic model 
of history, Louisa Barton and her fellow herstorians create a sense of synchronicity: all of the 
stories are happening at once. This denial of historical progress charted against linear time 
denies history any transformative power. Because of their isolation from authoritative, 
progressive, patriarchal history, women repeat the same narrative, creating a text that 
constantly doubles back on itself and begins again and again. 
 
Interfering with the linear cause-and-effect progression of history affects other narratives that 
rely on strict chronological accumulation as a fundamental support. Blackstone’s use of 
familial metaphors for the relationship between lineage and law also suits the process by 
which the law comes into being. In both texts, the protagonists are the result of political, 
juridical, and personal lineages, but gender causes an irreparable breach where otherwise 
these narratives should produce a continuous, viable subject. Juridical and political lineage 
creates the space into which the desired subject fits. Authoritative history, for example 
Hume’s The History of England, culminates in the triumph of the (Protestant, male, white, 
Tory) citizen, an identity with a known ancestry and a known future. Thus, political lineage 
stretches in both directions from the zero-point of the present; narratives that do not fit the 
teleological structure of patriarchal history fall away as irrelevant, excessive, and personal, 
therefore cannot be universal, applicable, or instrumental. Denied a public role, Louisa 
Barton suffers from a lack of legal and historical subjectivity and an excess of subjectivity: 
her legal self is “subsumed” by coverture, yet she remains, stubbornly, a separate being. In its 
legal definition, marriage is an unbalanced equation and the remainder cannot be 
satisfactorily abstracted away. The law requires wives only insofar as they ensure lineage, in 
order that property, position, and power continue down established channels of inheritance. 
Women, however, extend the parameters of lineage well beyond legal and political 
functionality. The affective kinship created through reading letters extends outwards, 
laterally, and disseminates cultural capital widely. Sidney and Louisa’s personal experiences 
are beyond the “control” of any owner, whether the writer, the editor, or the author.  
 
At the level of form, these texts enact exchange and reciprocation between available literary 
models in the late eighteenth-century marketplace; both works also engage questions of 
property, ownership, and belonging at the level of content. Narrative plots involving property 
and law in both texts equally reflect the authors’ engagement with historiography and legal 
writing. Thus the models of resistance enacted at the level of text resonate in the decisions 
taken by the characters in reaction to their particular situations. Sidney, for example, is 
explicitly family property, bartered on the marriage market to the highest buyer. Sidney’s 
brother, George, ensures the preservation of family lineage, signified by the already-
determined inheritance of family property. Sidney’s passivity, she has “no will of her own”, 
should negate the emphatic self-expression within her memoirs, yet it is through her careful 
circumspection of her own and other women’s stories that she attains a self-hood (SB 85). 
Sidney also carefully maintains her marginality within a system of legal property inheritance: 
her family’s property – that is, her husband’s property – flows smoothly down family lines 
through conventionally legal channels. It is liquid wealth and mobile chattels that Sidney 
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moves outside of linear, consanguineal family inheritance to a broader network of friends and 
philanthropic causes. The only time she accepts wealth in her own name, it is as the result of 
self-denial and her properly sympathetic response to Ned Warner’s plea for assistance. Thus, 
Sidney’s “memoirs”, her private history, are an extension of her desire to keep property 
(including herself) private.  
 
This desire for privacy motivates Sidney’s most intense articulation of belonging, which 
comes after Mr Arnold’s abandonment of his wife and children, when she is forced to 
maintain herself in property belonging to her mother. Sidney is never happier than when she 
is “a queen . . . in the house of my nativity” (SB 265). Her subsequent journal-letters include a 
proud inventory of “her” property – vitally it is hers through her own recognition of her 
labour: “I am grown a perfect farmer’s wife, and have got a notable dairy: I am mistress of 
three cows, I assure you, which more than supply my family; then I have the best poultry in 
the country, and my garden flourishes like Eden” (SB 268). Not only does Sidney proudly 
describe the extent of her holdings, she also notes that her management creates excess. 
Named after her mother’s dower house, Sidney clearly represents frustrated female 
ownership and women’s frustration at being owned. Sidney’s name emphasises her status as 
her mother’s property and simultaneously questions the authority behind Mrs Bidulph’s 
ownership. Mrs Bidulph, as a woman and as a wife, can only ever be a surrogate father and 
“as such always improper, a substitute, a usurper” since “by the laws of patrimony, a mother 
has nothing of her own to pass on” (Alliston 116-17). Morbidly, Sidney’s mother’s death is 
the limit of Sidney’s sojourn in her happy home: as her dowry, Mrs Bidulph’s house passes to 
her son, as part of the family property. In a similar way, Louisa Barton’s independence before 
marriage – she is described by her sister as “[y]oung, beautiful, rich, and accomplished” – 
also contrasts sharply with her dependence as a wife (LB 2:117). The female possessive self 
can only ever be a temporary lease from the “real” (male) owner; Mrs Bidulph’s possession 
of Sidney-castle and of Sidney herself depends on the (good)will of her dead husband and her 
future son-in-law.  
 
Significantly, Sidney’s first daughter is named for Sidney’s mother, Dolly, suggesting 
another way of preserving lineage beneath the notice of legal conveyance. Speaking of her 
daughter, Sidney’s assertion that she has “a right to all the duty, all the filial love that this 
creature can shew me, in return for my fondness” is equally applicable to the relationship she 
has with her mother (SB 117). This expression of maternal love as exchange lays bare the 
contractual nature of sentimental ties but also reveals the inadequacy of legal language to 
cover the contingencies of sentimentalised family relationships. This transaction is outside of 
legally binding contracts but partakes of the same language and solemnity. As a sentimental 
contract, its terms remain unquantifiable, yet Sidney’s experiences in the marriage market 
expose the ease with which sentimental value could translate into material worth. Sidney’s 
value as a virtuous, sensible and “very good girl” enables her to demand more than a “bare 
equivalent” in her future husband’s estate (SB 15). Mrs Bidulph recognises Sidney’s virtue 
and sensibility as property, with value in excess of Sidney’s real financial worth (£4,000). 
Sidney’s declarations of self-possession, her refusal to obey her brother’s wishes, particularly 
once “free” of both Arnold and her mother, alienate her from her remaining consanguineal 
family. Yet, it is only through her insistent refusal to partake of Sir George’s wealth and 
participate in a purely economic system of exchange that Sidney retains her sentimental 
virtue and, by extension, the reader’s sympathy. By refusing to insist on her due as Sir 
George’s sister and challenge Lady Sarah’s position in his priorities, Sidney silently 
confronts the primacy of the conjugal family unit and her own inferior position as 
consanguineal kin.  
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While Louisa is never under financial stress, as Sidney often is, her generosity as “Lady 
Bountiful” is a threat to her husband’s property. The incident she relates to Fanny as proof of 
“the uncouthness of [her] present situation, with regard to [Sir William]” implies the extent to 
which female philanthropy was connected to men’s financial resources (LB 1:68). As Gillian 
Skinner suggests, the limits of sensibility become evident in this clash between Sir William’s 
fiscal and managerial practicality and Louisa’s desire for a conventional sentimental 
experience (91-116). His hyperbolic projection of the effects of Louisa’s charity, that it will 
inspire his tenants to “fire every cottage on his lands, and he should be run into gaol by [her] 
generosity”, comments on the incompatibility of female sensibility and economic 
responsibility, but also more generally on the gullibility and foolishness of sensibility (LB 
1:69). Sidney’s philanthropy is considerably more cautious than Louisa’s whose 
unquestioning generosity with money and property reflects negatively on her care for her 
husband’s other property: namely, herself. For Sir William, sensibility is an economic 
liability in a wife. His own management and assessment of the actual amount the 
impoverished family requires trumps Louisa’s impulsive sentimental impulse – his generous 
£20 dwarfs her offering of 10 guineas. It also serves to remind Louisa of her station as a wife 
and her object-status as part of Sir William’s property, not as an equal sharer in its 
distribution.  
 
Sheridan suggests the same anxiety over women’s dissemination of family property in Mrs 
Bidulph’s negotiation of Sidney’s jointure. Securing an estate “detached intirely” from the 
rest of Arnold’s property as Sidney’s portion, Mrs Bidulph removes any possibility for 
Sidney to spend money properly belonging to her husband’s heir (SB 94).2 By controlling his 
wife’s dissemination of money, Sir William also reinforces his control of her body and 
person; his request that Louisa “put up [her] money” is accompanied by a physical restraint 
that serves to alienate Louisa from her social role as “Lady Barton” by refusing her the 
“virtuous pleasure of bestowing charity” proper to the wife of a wealthy landowner (LB 1:68, 
69). While Sidney’s sensibility is allowed to shine through her careful philanthropy 
(particularly in the case of the aptly named Miss Price) once she is a widow, Sir William 
stifles Louisa’s attempt to exercise this “vital component of . . . so many eighteenth-century 
definitions of virtuous femininity” because of his anxiety over the potentially unlimited 
nature of this generosity (Skinner 95). Like the romances with which her sister and her 
husband associate her, Louisa might not know when to stop.  
 
As a wife, Sidney’s financial and emotional generosity is properly focused inward, onto her 
own conjugal family. Though ostensibly it is her decision to rescind her control over her 
jointure to her husband to repay debts accrued during his affair with Mrs Gerrarde, Sidney is 
still arguably “kissed” out of property by her husband.3 Sheridan contrasts Sidney’s wifely 
selflessness and explicit disregard for material wealth in favour of the sanctity of the 
sentimental conjugal family with representations of predatory, acquisitive women outside of 
affinal bonds. In both Mrs Gerrarde and the widow Arnold, desire for material property is 
linked to sexual impropriety: Mrs Gerrarde is not only involved in an illicit sexual affair with 
Mr Arnold, she also negotiates the fatal affair between her niece, Miss Burchell, and 
Faulkland; the widow Arnold lived separately from her husband and launches the (possibly 
fraudulent) lawsuit with the assistance of her long-time lover. The lawsuit that eventually 
ruins Arnold depends on the widow establishing her own sexual fidelity to prove the 
legitimacy of an heiress born after her husband’s death. Because she has not produced an heir 
before her husband’s death, the widow Arnold is effectively pushed out of her conjugal 
family – she has no consanguineal tie to naturalize the contractual tie of marriage. All of the 
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women whose fortunes converge around Mr Arnold serve to illustrate women’s vulnerable 
position in terms of family, property, and inheritance: that is, neither Mrs Gerrarde nor the 
widow Arnold apparently has any consanguineal family to whom they can apply for 
assistance. Sidney’s pride keeps her from approaching Sir George but it is evident that she 
has no claim on any property belonging to her consanguineal family. Sidney makes a point of 
noting that the few jewels she has were her mother’s “when she was a maiden”: “The greatest 
part of [Mrs Bidulph’s jewels], and by much the finest, were presented to her by my father; 
but those she reserves for Sir George, against the time of his marriage, as a present for his 
lady; for they are family jewels” (SB 32, my emphasis). Sidney’s marriage carries her out of 
the family, but her right to property belonging to the “family” is already tenuous given that 
Sir George’s future wife has a greater claim to family property than she does at any time. 
Later in her memoirs, her repeated and vocal devotion to Mr Arnold, despite his open 
adultery, underscores her acceptance of her own status as property and tests the propriety of 
her emotional and financial generosity. Mrs Gerrarde and the widow Arnold, on the other 
hand, demand recognition as owners of property through their command over propertied men. 
Women outside of marriage represent a parasitical threat to family security and property 
inheritance. Even when acting within the law, women attempting to control real estate are 
trespassing on property belonging, at least in a sentimentally “deserving” sense, to another 
character.  
 
In Griffith’s splintered text, Louisa and Fanny (and Griffith herself), illustrate the uncanny 
ability for a democratic approach to history to produce unlimited stories and interpretations. 
Women deny their status as property by refusing to be contained – in marriage, in death, in 
convents. Louisa Barton’s history unlocks the silence traditionally covering these particularly 
feminized experiences. Indeed, the boundaries between these experiences collapse: Louisa’s 
history ends in death; both Delia and Olivia Walter experience all three in some form or 
another; even Fanny Cleveland’s history explores the freedom and potential for a young, 
wealthy, and virtuous woman outside of parental or conjugal control. History, as property, 
becomes communal and because of this produces more histories, more “wealth”. As the first 
in a series of narratives collected by Louisa, Mrs Walter’s story repays her attention by 
producing more stories. Rather than being “above economy”, The History of Lady Barton 
participates in a virtual economy of words and stories (Skinner 93).4 While this metaphor 
seems to elevate the novel unproductively above the level of direct interest or involvement in 
social, political, and legal issues, it is important to note that these stories are recorded (in 
many cases, rerecorded) and therefore become material products of labour. They turn into 
cultural and sentimental commodities for the historian-sisters and, through inclusion in the 
novel, circulate as commercial commodities as well. The formal and structural challenge 
within the text to both capitalist commodification and hegemonic history exists in the 
community of historians and the democratic nature of their project. The structure of the text 
allows the different voices equal and autonomous space in the narrative: the interpolated 
narratives are not judged by Fanny and Louisa for historical truth, but rather for the subject’s 
suffering, which is never quantified in the assistance offered of the space devoted to the 
narrative. The novel as a whole can be seen as a model for Louisa’s “protestant  monastery”, 
performing the essential function of providing a refuge and a community in which women 
“reciprocally vouch” for one another’s conduct (LB 2: 57). Louisa and Fanny constantly 
suggest alternative spaces for women’s histories, only to find them essentially flawed (for 
practical and ideological reasons). The novel itself offers space and community for women’s 
histories outside of patriarchal models of omission and dominance through the cultural 
ambiguity of the term “history” and exploiting the generic instability of both history and 
novel.  
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Significantly, Louisa’s history will “push Madame de Scuderi from the shelf she has so long 
usurped in a lady’s library” (LB 1: 38). Fanny’s assessment of her sister’s narrative implicitly 
questions the propriety of women writing history, reflecting the associations between gender 
and genre. Her concerns for Louisa rest on the disjunction of “a married woman’s meeting 
with adventures of the novel kind” (LB 1: 171). As the story of a married woman, Lady 
Barton challenges generic assumptions about the place for wives in romances, sentimental 
novels, and histories. The History of Lady Barton begins after this generic story – after that 
“most solemn and hazardous act” of marriage – and deals almost entirely with the 
relationship between husband and wife (LB 2:294). Unlike typical sentimental novels, the 
supporting narratives detail courtship and marriage, while the heroine’s story explores the 
nature of “wife”. Parents, particularly fathers, are curiously absent in the present moment of 
Lady Barton: the narratives of Olivia Walter and Maria feature benignly good mothers, while 
Delia Colville’s story (told through Fanny’s letters) contains the problematic figure of Mrs 
Colville who fakes her daughter’s death to take her place as George Cleveland’s wife. Thus 
mothers, while not completely absent, are ineffective: either deified for their adherence (after 
their husbands’ deaths) to “chaste connubial love” or actively perverting their daughters’ 
progression to wives (LB 3: 218). None of the women in the text question who their parents 
are and the withdrawal of paternal authority makes space for women’s project of history. 
 
As part of Sheridan and Griffith’s critique of property and inheritance, both texts focus on 
sibling relationships, suggesting a shift away from vertical, progressive lineage to a lateral, 
synchronous model. Lady Barton dispenses with the traditional imperative to demonstrate 
progress as evidence of history; the novel does not “make progress” and there is no epiphany 
waiting at the conclusion. For a project of “history”, Lady Barton covers the space of only 
twenty-five years, including the inset narratives, and takes place within no more than two or 
three years.5 This suggests the extent to which women have no access to records establishing 
a historical pattern for female experience – a point that brings these sentimental novels closer 
to the Gothic model with its circular depiction of time and inheritance. Louisa’s history can 
only be the history of her particular moment; lacking a historical or public identity, she 
cannot participate in the extension of the self into a matrix of belonging founded in history 
and legal narratives. History, for women in Griffith’s novel, is a negative sum game: closed 
by the death of the historian-heroine, the text replaces Louisa’s unhappy marriage to Sir 
William with a model of sentimental conjugal felicity in Fanny and Lord Hume. The “lesson” 
of Louisa’s history, like the unravelling narrative of The Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph 
remains in the continued existence and constant presence of the text. Louisa opens her history 
with a quotation that “expressed [her] present feelings, so much better than [she] could” 
herself; the end of the novel leaves Fanny with “no words [to] paint the grief and distraction” 
of her family at Louisa’s death (LB 1:1, 3:308). This is the silence of coverture; the 
paradoxical experience of women as the centre and the abject frontier of sensibility, history, 
and the law. 
 
The critique of the inextricable nature of property from a progressivist concept of history is 
also evident at the end of The Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph. Sidney’s history culminates 
in property ownership and wealth; the reader has followed her from wealth without 
autonomy, through autonomy without wealth, to a position of circumscribed legal autonomy 
(as a widow) accompanied by wealth. The sudden ending, followed by Cecilia’s brief 
supplement that falls into incoherence, resists closure as surely as Lady Barton’s fragmented 
narrative. The form and structure of Sidney’s memoirs are ultimately insufficient as an 
expression of her experience. Nine years later, the publication of Conclusion of the Memoirs 
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of Miss Sidney Bidulph (1770) illustrates the extent of anxiety the original text created in its 
readership. The editor’s fruitless investigation to “recover any more of the (original) 
manuscript” reopens in the Conclusion when he discovers Patty Main’s daughter “in 
possession of some papers, which contained the whole story” (1-2). In both of Sheridan’s 
texts, women’s history resides with women; it is their particular property – a legacy that 
Sheridan and Griffith expand by including their readership in the transmission of cultural 
capital. The heroines of their works become more than the private property of one tyrant or 
one system; dead, fictional, and silenced, Sidney and Louisa gesture towards an ontological 
truth about women’s experience as always-already consumed, already owned by someone 
else. Nonetheless, Sheridan and Griffith’s novels are not descriptions of women’s failure to 
project themselves into narratives of cultural, social, and legal belonging, nor are they purely 
pessimistic views of women’s relations with patriarchal power structures. As conduct and 
anti-conduct books, history and romance, these texts encourage strategies of resistance and an 
awareness of the limitations of genre.  
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Notes 
 
1. Briefly, directed and credited citations include: Pope (The Rape of the Locke, Eloisa 
to Abelard), La Rochefoucauld, Swift (“Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift”), Mozart 
(The Marriage of Figaro), and Milton (Paradise Lost); characters also drop names 
from contemporary British literature, as well as from ancient history and classical 
mythology. 
 
2. Mrs Bidulph’s legal cunning is obscured beneath her spoken considerations for the 
“proper” estate for a widow to inhabit: Sidney’s jointure comes from Arnold’s 
personal estate, which keeps it from inclusion in the law-suit prepared by the widow-
Arnold (Arnold’s sister-in-law) for control of the family estates (SB 111). 
 
3. See Susan Staves, Married Women’s Separate Property in England, 1660-1833, 
particularly chapter 5, ‘Pin Money and Separate Property’ (131-61). 
 
4. Skinner notes that Lady Barton inhabits a space where management of resources is 
not an issue though this is possibly because Sir William controls the family’s 
finances, believing his wife to be ‘too young’ to be trusted with money (Skinner 91; 
LB 1: 68-69). Skinner’s comment raises the question of what is being managed. The 
text ultimately reveals Louisa’s careful economy of histories and how she and Fanny 
are able to turn these virtual economies into material products and enter a cultural 
economy of ideology and identity. 
 
5. This estimate takes into consideration the ages of Louisa Barton and Fanny Cleveland 
and the fact that all of the women in the text seem to be of an age. No story reaches 
further back than the birth of its narrator and the end of each narrative brings it to the 
present moment of Louisa’s writing. 
  
14
ABO:  Interactive Journal for Women in the Arts, 1640-1830, Vol. 2 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/abo/vol2/iss1/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2157-7129.2.1.3
  
Works Cited 
 
Alliston, April. “The Value of a Literary Legacy: Retracing the Transmission of Value 
through Female Lines.” The Yale Journal of Criticism 4:1 (1990): 109-27. Print. 
 
Blackstone, Sir William. Commentaries on the Laws of England. 4 volumes. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1764-69. Print. 
 
Boswell, James. The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. 2 volumes. London, 1791. Print. 
 
Chaplin, Sue. Gothic and the Rule of Law, 1764-1820. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 
2007. Print. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230801400  
 
Griffith, Elizabeth. The History of Lady Barton. 3 Volumes. London:  Davies, 1773. Print. 
 
Guest, Harriet. Small Change: Women, Learning, Patriotism, 1750-1810. Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 2000. Print. 
 
Langbauer, Laurie. Women and Romance: The Consolations of Gender in the English Novel. 
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990. Print. 
 
Looser, Devoney. British Women Writers and the Writing of History, 1680-1820. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 2000. Print. 
 
 “Art. 28: The History of Lady Barton.” Monthly Review 46 (Feb. 1772): 165. Print. 
 
Pearson, Jacqueline. Women’s Reading in Britain, 1750-1835: A Dangerous Recreation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. Print. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511582899  
 
Perry, Ruth. Novel Relations: The Transformation of Kinship in English Literature and 
Culture, 1748-1818. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004. Print. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511484438  
 
Sheridan, Frances. Conclusion of the Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph. London: Dodsley, 
1770. Print. 
 
---. The Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph. 1761. Ed. Patricia Köster and Jean Coates Cleary. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995. Print. 
 
Skinner, Gillian. Sensibility and Economics in the Novel, 1740-1800: The Price of a Tear. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999. Print. 
 
Staves, Susan. Married Women’s Separate Property in England, 1660-1833. Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1990. Print. 
 
 
15
Kramer: The Limits of Genre
Published by Scholar Commons, 2012
